China’s “Polar Silk Road.” 2. A Threat to Freedom, Ecology, and Human Rights

Beijing’s harmful impact on academic integrity

Polar scientific collaborations can be seen as part of a broader and more strategic bilateral relationships between Beijing and the Arctic states. Among the latter, Iceland has been the most proactive and has been consequently developing closer relations with the PRC for around a decade, including a bilateral Arctic science exchange that started in 2011. In the case of Norway, following the restoration of relations between the two countries in December 2016, in April 2018 Norway’s Ministry of Research and Education led a delegation of 250 of the country’s heads of universities and scientists to strengthen the Chinese-Norwegian research collaboration.

Obviously, researchers may be influenced either directly or indirectly to produce results that support the PRC’s Arctic plans and strategies. By offering generous grants and treating researchers with dinners and gifts, government-funded academic exchange programs and conferences aim primarily at building trust and strengthening the status of Beijing as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder that is not only interested in the region’s resources.

Also, these multilateral forums may put academics under pressure to censor their works. Although the Arctic context is less sensitive than other sectors, it is a priority for the Chinese government to advance an image of its country as a responsible Arctic stakeholder.

A bad example in tackling climate change

Whatever one thinks of the theories of human origin of the climate change, and the consequent need to reduce human productive activities to counter it, countries in the world have committed to nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of climate change mitigation.

The PRC’s NDC is not very ambitious, and the country is likely to meet or exceed it, which would allow the party-state to use the results for propaganda purposes both at home and abroad. Beijing is not likely to commit itself to more serious emissions reductions targets in the future. Such a commitment would in fact cause a high risk of losing face in case of failing to reach the target.

China’s NDC is insufficient in to reach the goal of limiting the global temperature rise to 2°C that was decided at the Paris Climate Accords, the international treaty that was signed in 2016 and is commonly known as “The Paris Agreement.” Simply put, unless other states do not implement much more ambitious emissions reductions measures, the PRC’s poor record on the topic will frustrate and jeopardize the whole attempt.

In particular, Beijing has not indicated how much its emissions will grow before they peak. In 2015, a number of Arctic Council observer states submitted, on a voluntary basis, their national reports on enhanced black carbon and methane emissions reductions, including France, Japan, Poland, Spain, Korea, India, Italy, and the European Union (EU). But not the PRC.

Beijing’s role as an emitter of greenhouse gases, including short-lived climate forcers, is part of the country’s broader environmental footprint in the Arctic. Chinese actors may affect Arctic habitats more directly through the investments of Chinese companies in places such as Greenland, northern Canada, or Siberia. Chinese demand for resources is the key contributor to the extractive industries investment potential in the Arctic. For instance, in 2013, the PRC imported more than 60% of the international iron ore trade. The country accounted for 44% of global nickel demand in 2011. Beijing is a major and growing market for pulp derived from boreal forests. Moreover, Chinese shipping activities have marine and air environmental impacts in the Arctic, which are bound to increase with growing traffic.

In other words, the PRC largely contributes to the environmental problems of the Arctic, most conspicuously through the impacts of climate change, but also through other pollutants that end up in the Arctic. Moreover, the country does not participate in the Arctic Council Working Group on black carbon and methane, which could present an important contribution to addressing the impacts of climate change (again, whatever one may think of it) in the North. Part of the black carbon that is deposited there has its origins in China. Beijing is in sum part of the problem, not of the solution

Dubious acts toward the indigenous peoples

Last but not least, there are issues with the Arctic indigenous people. The PRC has a peculiar understanding of the matter. It perceives that there are no indigenous peoples within its borders, as for it being “indigenous” arises exclusively from the context of colonization and conquest. You can call people within your borders “indigenous,” the Chinese regime argues, if and when you are a nasty colonizer that conquered and destroyed them. Thus, since the PRC claims it is not a nasty colonizer that conquers and destroys (unlike the West), it insists that there are no indigenous people in China and all minorities are protected and happy.

In this view of the Chinese government, the issue of Arctic’s indigenous rights does not apply to the PRC itself, but only to others. This means that PRC’s international statements on indigenous issues are seen in Beijing as having no implications for the PRC’s internal affairs, including their relations to international criticism of the Beijing government regarding its policies towards minority ethnic groups, such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Southern Mongolians, and others.

In the past, Chinese investors and financial institutions have been accused of neglecting indigenous interests in places such as Africa or South America, in particular in cases of hydropower, mining, and agricultural projects.

It is true, Beijing is a fairly vocal supporter of indigenous rights internationally, but this always concerns “the others.” It does not regard it as a domestic Chinese problem, nor as a problem of the Arctic, where Beijing tries to expand. It never spoke of indigenous issues in terms of indigenous rights, not it has organized any practical co-operation with the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants organizations, in contrast to, for instance, Singapore, India, or the EU.

Also, Chinese investments related to tourism have proven controversial in some parts of the Arctic. In northeast Iceland, Svalbard and in the Lyngen area in Norway, Chinese billionaire tycoon Huang Nubo planned to purchase vast swaths of land to develop tourist services. However, local resistance and national environmental and security concerns prevented the finalization of these transactions, and in the Lyngen case, the construction of the tourist resort itself.

The way forward

Some modes of the PRC presence in the Arctic may adversely affect the current, generally positive attitude towards Chinese investors in the polar region. These include: major land purchases, especially in areas of high environmental, biodiversity, or landscape value; bringing in Chinese workforce in significant numbers; and the involvement of Chinese construction companies on terms that would be perceived by local actors as unfair competition. Decision-makers in Arctic Council must then apply particular scrutiny in the case of investments that would give Chinese companies influence over the construction and use of critical infrastructures such as railways or airports.

Beijing has been increasingly involved in regional international organizations to signal its willingness to exercise state power under institutional constraints—and the Arctic Council is no exception. These approaches aim to send a series of signals to conventional Arctic states, reassuring them that China is “not a revisionist power” that pursues hegemony in the region.

Chinese ventures in the Arctic could further accelerate the region’s vulnerabilities and its associated traditional and non-traditional security issues impacting the wider region. This may possibly affect even the world as a whole, through a new strategic subtle attack from the Boreal Region.