Why the India-Australia-Japan Trilateral Should Be Strengthened

Since the Cold War era, the US has been the primary security contributor to its allies worldwide, including in East Asia. However, under the Trump administration, the US appears to be downgrading its security role in the Indo-Pacific by not confronting the Chinese coercion. This has contributed to the weakening of the US-led deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and has emboldened the Chinese coercion.

This can be best illustrated by the recent diplomatic spat between China and Japan and the ensuing Chinese coercion against Japan. In a Diet meeting on November 7, Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi claimed that the Chinese military occupation of Taiwan would be a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, amounting to a legal justification for its self-defence. Following Takaichi’s statement, China vociferously demanded that Takaichi retract her remarks on Taiwan. It also militarily coerced Japan. The Chinese aircrafts – launched from the Liaoning aircraft carrier – intermittently locked onto their radar at the Japanese aircrafts near the Okinawa island, raising the prospect of inadvertent escalation. An aircraft usually illuminates its fire control radar at the time of executing an attack. Additionally, China also carried out a joint drill with the Russian bombers near Japan in a “show of force”. Thus, Chinese coercion of Japan suggests a weakening of the US-led deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Instead of supporting its ally, the US response at the leadership level has been largely muted in the China-Japan confrontation. Trump reportedly urged Takaichi not to escalate the dispute with China, as Trump prepares for his visit to China next year for trade talks.

The US has also decelerated the cooperation in regional minilaterals, which were formed to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad (consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the US) did not hold its leadership-level meeting, scheduled to be hosted in India in 2025, due to tensions between India and the US. The cooperation in other regional minilaterals, such as the Japan-South Korea-US, Australia-Japan-US, and the Squad (consisting of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US), has also stalled due to the loss of momentum during Trump’s presidency. Put simply, the Trump administration does not perceive China as an adversary in the Indo-Pacific, warranting countervailing efforts from the regional countries. This is consistent with Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS), which refrained from framing China as the most significant challenge to US security – a stark departure from the previous NSS documents.

Therefore, under the Trump administration, the US appears to lack the intention to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. Since deterrence is the product of capabilities and intentions, the US-led deterrence is eroding in the Indo-Pacific as a result. Due to this, doubts have been raised about the US’ political reliability in the capitals across the Indo-Pacific.

Considering the erosion of the US’ reliability in the Indo-Pacific, regional countries must step up cooperation to build deterrence against China. The India-Australia-Japan (IAJ) trilateral represents the best approach to achieve this.

After its formation in 2015, the IAJ trilateral disappeared under the shadows of the reinvigorated Quad by the Trump administration in 2017. Since the Quad also included the US, therefore, it became the paramount grouping to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. Now, since Trump – in his second term – has put the Quad on the back burner, the remaining three countries of the grouping can collaborate in countering China under the IAJ trilateral.

Although the IAJ trilateral may fall short in countering China’s military capabilities (in the absence of the US), however, deterrence also includes perceptual factors. Therefore, a revitalised IAJ trilateral, representing Indo-Pacific’s three most important democracies, can be the foremost tool in countering China’s maritime coercion in the Indo-Pacific.

Maritime security is the most natural area of cooperation among the three countries. During the 4th IAJ trilateral dialogue in 2017, the grouping stressed the need for greater collaboration in maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA). Maritime security becomes all the more critical in the light of China’s expanding maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and the three countries are facing its repercussions in different theatres of competition. For instance, India is facing the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region, while Australia is in the Western Pacific, and Japan is in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Therefore, all three countries can synergise their efforts in countering China in their respective theatres of competition in the Indo-Pacific. It will strengthen deterrence against Chinese coercion in the Indo-Pacific.

Joint military exercises and patrols present a formidable way to demonstrate resolve against China’s coercive actions. Moreover, such exercises and patrols can also include countries experiencing China’s maritime coercion, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, to build resilience against Chinese maritime expansion.

The revitalised IAJ trilateral will also carry symbolic significance. At a time when the majority of countries in the Indo-Pacific are hedging between the US and China, the IAJ trilateral represents the autonomous approach of navigating the US-China rivalry by forging practical areas of security cooperation.

Thus, China’s coercion in the Indo-Pacific necessitates countervailing efforts by the regional countries, as the US, under the Trump administration, appears to be uninterested in countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, a US minus Indo-Pacific, represented by the IAJ trilateral, can be the most effective approach to deter Chinese coercion in the Indo-Pacific.