Ankara's Aggressive Push for Syria Maritime Deal Exposes Limits of Influence

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Turkey has aggressively pursued a maritime boundary agreement with Damascus's new HTS-led government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa—aiming to counter isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean and preempt any potential Cyprus-Syria pact.

The recent November 2025 ratification of the long-stalled Lebanon-Cyprus maritime deal—demarcating EEZs and opening doors to energy exploration—has further weakened Ankara's position, encircling its claims and bolstering EU-aligned blocs.

This frenzy has intensified scrutiny over Turkey's true leverage in post-Assad Syria. While Ankara played a pivotal role in HTS's rise and enjoys deep ties, many view Damascus as far from a full Turkish client.

The real litmus test? Whether Erdogan can force through this deal.

For al-Sharaa, it's a tough call: He desperately needs US support for sanctions relief, reconstruction aid, and international legitimacy—yet Washington's Eastern Med priorities (backing Cyprus, Israel, and gas routes bypassing Turkey) increasingly clash with Ankara's "Blue Homeland" ambitions.

A rejection would signal Damascus's growing independence—and Turkey's overreach.